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With the emergence of an information society, the idea of protecting sensitive data is steadily
gaining importance. Conventional encryption methods may not be sufficient to guarantee data
protection in the future. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an emerging technology that exploits
fundamental physical properties to guarantee perfect security in theory. However, it is not easy to
ensure in practice that the implementations of QKD systems are exactly in line with the theoretical
specifications. Such theory-practice deviations can open loopholes and compromise security. Several
such loopholes have been discovered and investigated in the last decade. These activities have
motivated the proposal and implementation of appropriate countermeasures, thereby preventing
future attacks and enhancing the practical security of QKD. This article introduces the so-called
field of quantum hacking by summarizing a variety of attacks and their prevention mechanisms.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The need for security
The art of making and breaking secrets can be traced
to the early civilizations [1]. The word crypto for exam-
ple has its origins in ancient Greek and means ‘hidden’
or ‘secret’. The seeds of modern cryptology were sown
around 1200 years ago by the Arabs, who invented sys-
tematic methods such as frequency analysis to unravel
hidden messages. With the advent and rise of informa-
tion and telecommunication technologies, most notably
the Internet, the interest in cryptography has shot up
exponentially in the last decades. Increasing amounts of
text and voice records, e.g. in emails and phone calls,
are being cryptographically secured every day. This im-
plies that the contents of the messages are (hopefully)
made indecipherable to and unalterable by unauthorized
parties — often called adversaries — and that the identi-
ties of the sender and the receiver are mutually attested.
In particular, industry, banks, and governments strongly
depend on such confidential communication.
1. Cast of characters
From a communication point of view, the most funda-
mental setting to study cryptography involves three enti-
ties: the message sender Alice, the message receiver Bob,
and an adversary Eve, who is not authorized to know the
contents of these messages but is nonetheless (malevolent
and) interested in doing so. Alice and Bob are connected
together by one or more communication channels over
∗ nitinj1981@gmail.com
which they exchange — send and receive — these mes-
sages. Eve can exert varying amounts of control on these
channels. She may just passively eavesdrop, i.e. listen
to the exchange and simply copy it as best as possible
for analysis. Alternatively, she may actively tamper with
the messages, i.e. modify the existing content and/or in-
ject new messages. Finally, a technically-powerful Eve
may simultaneously impersonate Alice (and communi-
cate with Bob) and Bob (and communicate with Alice)
successfully, thus learning all of their secrets.
2. Basic security goals
Cryptographic schemes (also called ciphers) in modern
times follow the doctrine that an adversary can/will al-
ways find out how the system or the algorithm works.
The main implication of this doctrine is that all except
one piece of information — aptly called the private key
— must be simply assumed to be known to the adver-
sary. In a symmetric cipher, the keys held by Alice and
Bob are the same, while in an asymmetric cipher, Alice
and Bob each hold a key pair called public and private
key. Either way, these ciphers fulfill three basic security
requirements against the aforementioned actions of Eve:
1. Confidentiality: The message can be encrypted
— converted to a form from which Eve cannot de-
rive any useful information about the original mes-
sage — before being sent on the channel. Only en-
tities that possess the key(s) can correctly decrypt
the encryption, thus ensuring that the message con-
tents remain confidential to only Alice and Bob.
2. Integrity: Upon receiving the message, Bob can
get evidence if it was altered in transit. This step
reveals any potential tampering by Eve, thereby
assuring the integrity of the message. Depending
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2on the desired application, integrity can either be
assured in a standalone manner or along with con-
fidentiality.
3. Authenticity: During the entire communication,
Alice/Bob have the confidence that the entity on
the other end of the channel is Bob/Alice and not
Eve. Just like for encryption, Alice and Bob can
authenticate themselves using keys that are known
to only them, denying Eve the opportunity to pose
as Bob to Alice or vice-versa.
For most communication-based applications these days,
the task of authentication usually also addresses the re-
quirement of integrity. If Alice’s bit sequence has been
altered by Eve, both integrity and authenticity will be vi-
olated. Authentication combined with encryption, aptly
called authenticated encryption, forms one of the most
natural notions of information security [2].
B. Computational vs. Information-theoretic
security
An obvious question to ask at this point is, ‘What
guarantees the security of these ciphers?’ In the mod-
ern context, perhaps the most basic requirement is that
the keys must not be guessable for the adversary. This in
turn implies that the keys must be sufficiently long and
random as otherwise, the adversary may guess the cor-
rect key by means of an exhaustive search. Keys are typ-
ically realized as random bitstrings of a certain length.
For instance, the advanced encryption standard (AES)
cipher, which forms the workhorse of cryptographic secu-
rity nowadays, typically employs a 256-bit key. To break
a single AES encryption, an exhaustive search would take
2256 > 1075 steps, currently requiring billions of years
with state-of-the-art ultra-massive computing resources.
Conversely, a short key, such as in the data encryption
standard (DES) cipher, which was employed until the
early years of this century, can be guessed in a matter of
days on a normal computer or hours on a cluster of com-
puting devices. This is the reason why DES has officially
been declared insecure, as also illustrated in Fig. 1.
AES and DES are examples of symmetric ciphers.
Asymmetric ciphers, such as the RSA (named after its
inventors Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman), typically use
computational hardness to make it difficult for the ad-
versary to breach the security [3, 4]. These ciphers are
based on intractable mathematical problems that make
the cryptanalysis — recovery of the inputs from the out-
put — very difficult. To elaborate, RSA is based on the
prime factorization problem which essentially states that
it is computationally hard to find prime numbers p and
q, if only their product N(= p · q) is known. Typical
numbers involved in RSA problems these days are a few
hundred digits long, translating to key lengths typically
between 1024 to 2048 bits.
But surprisingly, many of the mathematical in-
tractabilities exist only because no efficient methods of
solving them (on classical computers) have been found
up to date 1. These include the discrete logarithm and
the prime factorization problems that together form the
foundations of several asymmetric ciphers in use today. It
is clear that the discovery of new algorithms that can be
efficiently operated on classical computers to solve these
problems would put the security of such ciphers in jeop-
ardy. Even otherwise, the security is at risk against an
adversary in possession of unusually large computational
resources that can run inefficient algorithms, yet solve
the problems in a reasonable amount of time. Finally,
efficient algorithms to crack these problems in the quan-
tum domain are already known [5]. As soon as quantum
computers of large enough scale become a reality, many
well-known asymmetric ciphers would be easily broken.
Figure 1 depicts these scenarios against a message en-
crypted using RSA-2048 bit key.
The security (or lack of it) of DES, AES, and RSA
can thus only be defined in a computational sense. In
other words, given the current state and progress of clas-
sical and quantum computing, while DES/RSA are defi-
nitely/likely insecure, AES may be considered computa-
tionally secure from a practical perspective. There does
exist another encryption mechanism known as the one
time pad (OTP) that does not make any assumptions
about the computational capabilities of the adversary. In
other words, it guarantees information-theoretic security
as also shown in Fig. 1.
C. The problem of key exchange
The theoretical origins of deploying the one time pad
as a private key for encryption can be found in Shannon’s
seminal work [6] while the first practical ideas for imple-
mentation are due to Vernam [7]. Despite these devel-
opments being more than half a century old, one rarely
hears of the OTP cipher in cryptographic installations
around the world. As also shown in Fig. 1, this is due to
the fact that the key/pad length must be at least as long
as the message. In addition, the key must be refreshed
for every new message. For typical communication band-
widths (of few Mbps) nowadays, these requirements im-
ply that Alice and Bob should somehow be able to access
a very large amount of private key material before the ac-
tual confidential exchange. This can be quite expensive
to satisfy for just two users; in a multiuser environment
such as the Internet, the cost of assuring unique, ran-
dom, and trustworthy keys to each user would scale up
to prohibitive levels with just a handful of users.
The alternative has been to use computationally-secure
symmetric ciphers, such as AES, where just a few hun-
1 In fact, the proof for non-existence of such methods is related to
one of the famous millennium problems.
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Computational versus Information-
theoretic security. The four ciphers: data encryption stan-
dard (DES), advanced encryption standard (AES), RSA, and
one time pad (OTP), can be considered to represent the con-
temporary cryptographic era and, possibly, its future. They
feature varying key lengths and differ algorithmically. In this
fictitous example, it is assumed that only the legitimate par-
ties possess the keys for the four ciphers. An adversary cap-
tures the corresponding ciphertexts ctXs, with X denoting
a cipher, and performs cryptanalysis with whatever abilities
he/she has in order to know the original message. Depend-
ing on the cipher, the adversary may or may not be able to
breach the cryptographic security today or in (near) future.
Note that longer keys do not necessarily imply a higher level
of security.
dreds of bits of the private keys can be used for encrypt-
ing Gbits of message data. Nonetheless, the problem of
how to securely distribute such private keys amongst Al-
ice and Bob before they can communicate remains open.
The current solution is to use asymmetric ciphers, such as
RSA, for only the key exchange. The security premise is
based on the fact that efficient algorithms to break asym-
metric ciphers have so far not been found. However, this
is a ticking bomb because as soon as an efficient algo-
rithm is discovered, or in some cases, the availability of
advanced quantum computers becomes a reality, the se-
curity provided by asymmetric ciphers will be in a major
crisis. Compounding the worry is the fact that an adver-
sary could simply be collecting and storing all ciphertexts
today to be able to break their security in the future.
Some data must remain secret for a long time, and in the
modern information society, this includes not just mili-
tary or financial secrets, but even data from individuals
(for example, genetic codes may require protection for
multiple generations).
D. (Post-)Quantum cryptography
There are currently two approaches to tackle the
above problem. The first, called quantum key distribu-
tion [8, 9], addresses the problem of key distribution di-
rectly using principles of quantum physics. The other
approach/field, called post-quantum cryptography, looks
at the development of novel classical ciphers that would
be invulnerable to quantum computers [10, 11]. Note
that even though its definition allows it to be, quantum
key distribution (QKD) was historically not considered
a part of post-quantum cryptography (PQC). The Euro-
pean Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI) has
recently taken cognizance of this by bringing both QKD
and PQC under an umbrella term: quantum-safe cryp-
tography [12].
The ideas that led to post-quantum cryptography were
first conceived in the late 1970s [13, 14]. The first for-
mal proposal of QKD was made in 1984 under the name
quantum cryptography [15] though the idea of quantum
money [16], dating back to late 1960s, is now recognized
as a precursor of this proposal. Although, as of today,
both QKD and PQC are conspicuous by their absence
in realistic communication systems/networks (most no-
tably the Internet), concerted efforts are being made to
facilitate their integration in the existing infrastructure.
In the following, we will concentrate on quantum key dis-
tribution.
II. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION (QKD)
A. Motivation: Optical communication and
security
In daily life, we usually deal with macroscopic objects
that are too large to perceive any quantum effects. A
light bulb switch, for example, can be either in the on-
state or in the off-state, but not in both at the same time.
These two states of the switch-light bulb system are of
course clearly distinguishable as well. In quantum me-
chanical terms, they are orthogonal. One can then imag-
ine Alice to use this lamp in order to transmit messages
from her room to one of her neighbours Bob who lives
somewhere in her line of sight. For that purpose, Alice
would encode her message in bits: lamp on would mean
Bit ‘1’ and lamp off represent the Bit ‘0’. Bob simply has
to write down the sequence of on/off states in order to
obtain the message. This way, Alice and Bob effectively
establish an optical communication link, resembling the
4beacon fires used in ancient times for transmitting signals
along e.g. the Roman Limes or the Great Wall of China.
However, if Alice and Bob want to exchange confiden-
tial messages via their line of sight link (formally called
a channel), they are in trouble. Since they have cho-
sen orthogonal and therefore easily distinguishable light
states for encoding their message, they cannot prevent
Eve from also reading and decoding the message.
Nowadays, Alice and Bob of course have more efficient
ways of optical communication. Alice could use a laser
followed by a fast modulator and transmit her encoded
light states to Bob via fibre-optic or atmospheric (line of
sight) links. Bob would demodulate the states and de-
tect them with fast photodiodes on which the impinging
light states generate current pulses. However, the basic
principle of using light states that are as orthogonal as
possible remains the same in modern optical communi-
cation. This means that anyone else having access to the
optical channel can read the messages. For instance, it
recently became public that the British government com-
munication headquarters (GCHQ) has been conducting
fibre tapping activities on a large scale. For that purpose,
GCHQ has installed intercepts at various landing points
of undersea cables. Remarkably, fibre tapping itself does
not actually require a sophisticated device since bending
a fibre is sufficient to have some light leak out of it.
Clearly, not just in the ‘neighbour’ scenario but also
in the case of modern optical communication, it is fea-
sible to eavesdrop on an optical channel and obtain the
message contents. In order to keep their communication
secret, Alice and Bob must therefore encrypt their mes-
sages using a key as explained in subsection I A 2. It turns
out that they can use their optical communication sys-
tem to share a random bit sequence known only to them
– essentially a secure symmetric key. But how do they
get the key without sharing it with the eavesdropper?
The solution, which consists of distribution of quantum
states between Alice and Bob to generate a shared sym-
metric key, is called quantum key distribution (QKD).
The optical channel used for the communication is called
quantum channel while the procedure is known as a pro-
tocol. Notably, at the end of the protocol, Alice and Bob
can find out whether the key distribution process was
eavesdropped. The operation and security of QKD pro-
tocols are based on concepts in quantum and classical
information processing [8, 9, 17, 18]. We discuss some of
the key principles of QKD below, followed by a discussion
on some common aspects of QKD protocols along with
a description of BB84, the first and the most well-known
QKD protocol [15].
B. Main principles
For easier comprehension we choose an example in
which the polarisation direction of Alice’s linearly polar-
ized laser beam is to be determined. An oft-used method
consists of rotating a polarizer around the beam axis un-
FIG. 2. Role of indistinguishability of non-orthogonal quan-
tum states in QKD. a) The quantum states u0 and u1 en-
code bits ‘0’ and ‘1’ respectively. Since they are orthogonal,
a measurement that can perfectly distinguish between them
is possible. b) No such measurement exists for the case of
non-orthogonal quantum states. The error in distinguishing
increases as the angle between u0 and u1 decreases.
til no intensity is observed on a photodetector placed af-
ter the polarizer. This means that the light is polarized
exactly orthogonal to the polarizer axis. (Looking at a
liquid crystal display with polarized sunglasses leads to
the same effect). The equation
cos θ =
√
I
I0
, (1)
also known as Malus’ law, describes this phenomenon.
Here I0 and I are the intensities before and after the
polarizer, respectively, and θ is the searched value of the
polarisation direction.
Let us also imagine that Alice reduces the output
power of her laser to a level where each signal state is
a single photon pulse. Actually, attenuating a coherent
laser does not exactly produce single-photon states but
photon number superpositions that follow a Poisson dis-
tribution with the mean photon number µ < 1. Such
states are called weak coherent states and they can also
be employed for QKD, as we shall elaborate later. For
now, let us assume that Alice has very weak laser pulses
with no more than one photon per pulse.
1. Non-orthogonality of quantum states
A setup for testing Malus’ law with such single pho-
ton pulses is possible since there are photodetectors that
get triggered by only one photon (such events are often
denoted by the term ‘clicks’ of the detector). However,
this photon is also destroyed by the measurement process
and therefore can be measured only once. With only one
single photon, we cannot measure the precise ratio I/I0,
because we have only two measurement outcomes: either
the detector clicks or it does not. Notably, these discrete
events happen with a cos2 θ probability.
The only possible cases of deterministic measurements
are when the polarisations of all single photons are
aligned either exactly along or orthogonal to the polarizer
axis. Figure 2(a) illustrates this situation. Two single
photons with unknown linear polarisations that are not
5orthogonal to each other, as depicted in Fig. 2(b) for ex-
ample, cannot be precisely discerned [18]. In other words,
bits ‘0’ and ‘1’ encoded by these non-orthogonal polar-
isations cannot be decoded by any entity including Eve
without making errors. In quantum mechanical parlance,
Eve’s interaction disturbs the quantum state and this dis-
turbance can both be detected and quantified. For that,
Alice and Bob can later exchange some other classical
information (about their preparation and measurement
methods for each of the single photons). Crucially, if the
amount of disturbance is below a certain level, Alice and
Bob can classically distill a shorter bit string — the se-
cret key — which is identical for Alice and Bob and on
which Eve has no information.
2. No-cloning theorem
A classical copy machine produces duplicates by scan-
ning the original which corresponds to a measurement
process. As discussed above, such a process is not pos-
sible with unknown quantum states since in general, a
single measurement does not reveal the full information
of the actual state. It can also be proven in general that
quantum mechanics allows no other method to produce
exact copies of unknown quantum states. This is known
as the no-cloning theorem [19].
For QKD, the no-cloning theorem is essential since it
forbids an eavesdropper to exactly copy the quantum sig-
nal. Nonetheless, approximate or imperfect copies of the
unknown quantum state can be produced by cloning ma-
chines [20]. An eavesdropping strategy based on cloning
may therefore allow Eve to gain some information about
the key without introducing any significant disturbances.
To obtain a perfectly-secure key, Alice and Bob need to
erase this partial information of Eve beforehand.
3. Authenticated channel
Apart from the quantum channel, Alice and Bob also
need a classical communication channel for distilling a
secret key out of their quantum state exchange. In con-
trast to the quantum channel, the information exchange
on this classical channel can be public in the sense that
Eve can listen to all messages of Alice and Bob. How-
ever, Eve must not be able to tamper with these classical
messages since otherwise, she can perform the so-called
man-in-the-middle attack in which she impersonates Bob
for Alice and vice-versa allowing her to gain knowledge
of the full key. To prevent such an attack, Alice and Bob
must be authenticated to each other. This implies that
a fully functioning QKD system provides authenticated
encryption; see subsection I A 2.
There are symmetric algorithms that provide
information-theoretic security for authentication [21, 22].
During the operation of the QKD protocol, Alice and
Bob can use a small amount of the distilled key from
the previous run for authentication purposes. However,
this poses a difficulty for the very first key exchange.
To elaborate, Alice and Bob would need a pre-shared
key before they have initiated the key exchange process.
Due to this, QKD is more accurately described as a
key growing (instead of generation) process: an initially
small key is grown to arbitrary length.
A practical solution to this initial problem, also men-
tioned in subsection I C, would be to use asymmetric key
ciphers only for the initial step. Notably, if Eve can-
not break the asymmetric key during the short moment
of the very first quantum key exchange, the system can
operate securely. This is because all further authentica-
tion steps would be performed by symmetric algorithms
that use a part of the secure key obtained from the QKD
protocol [23].
C. QKD protocols
A QKD protocol describes the procedures and oper-
ations that Alice and Bob perform in order to generate
a secret shared key sequence. A typical QKD protocol
consists of two main steps:
1. Quantum states are generated, transmitted
through a quantum channel and measured. At
the end of this exchange, Alice and Bob have bit
sequences from which a shorter but correlated bit
string could be extracted. Note that Eve can have
partial knowledge of the extracted string.
2. In order to distill a secret, shared key out of their
bit sequences, Alice and Bob perform classical data
processing, typically consisting of sifting, error cor-
rection and privacy amplification. We will explain
these terms in the coming pages.
For the quantum states, it is crucial that their quan-
tum properties are conserved (at least partially) after
having propagated through the quantum channel. Oth-
erwise Eve’s attacks could go undiscovered and the se-
curity premises of QKD would not be valid anymore.
Conservation of quantum properties means that the at-
tenuation and noise in the quantum channel may not
exceed certain levels. In practice, a variety of quantum-
optical states, such as single-photon states, coherent and
squeezed states, as well as entangled states have been
tested for suitability in quantum channels implemented
by optical fibres and free space links. The quantum in-
formation itself can be encoded in physical properties
such as polarisation, amplitude and phase quadratures
or time bins. The quantum state measurement strategy
is naturally decided by the details of the quantum state
preparation. For instance, polarisation-encoded single-
photon states may be decoded using a polarizer followed
by single photon detector(s), coherent states encoded in
quadratures may be decoded using phase-sensitive homo-
dyne detection [8, 9, 24].
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1. Example of a QKD protocol: BB84
While the details of the quantum state preparation
and measurement obviously depend on the specifics of
a QKD protocol, a fairly representative explanation can
be given through the BB84 protocol [15]. This protocol
was proposed at a conference in Bangalore, India in 1984
by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard. We consider
here a BB84 implementation with quantum information
encoded in one of four different polarisation states of sin-
gle photons.
For this purpose, Alice randomly switches between a
pair of mutually unbiased bases: in the Basis 0, denoted
by the orange/second subscript in Fig. 3a, the bit bA = 1
is encoded as a vertically polarized photon, bA = 0 as
a horizontally polarized photon (bits are denoted by the
blue/first subscript). Similarly, in the Basis 1, the bits 0
and 1 are encoded as diagonally and anti-diagonally po-
larized photons. Alice can generate these different polari-
sation states using four differently oriented single photon
sources (SPSs) or by modulating the polarisation of a
single SPS, as shown in Fig. 3b.
After propagation through the channel, Bob measures
each quantum state, also by randomly switching between
one of the two bases followed by detecting the photon. He
can switch the basis by rotating a polariser to either ver-
tical or 45◦ direction, corresponding to Basis 0 or 1 (see
Fig. 3c). In the cases where Bob’s basis choice matches
with Alice’s, a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ detector can measure a con-
clusive result: when the detector clicks, bit bB = bA = 1
(Yes), when there is no click, bit bB = bA = 0 (No). In
the cases where Bob chooses a different basis to Alice,
his measurement results will be random and inconclusive
(sometimes Yes, sometimes No).
To begin the classical processing, Alice and Bob run
through their entire bitstreams, sifting all inconclusive
events. For this, either of them discloses the bases (but
not the bit values) on the authenticated channel. Both
parties then learn of the slots where their bases had
matched; the corresponding bits together make the ‘raw
key’. Assuming the (unrealistic) case of a loss-less and
noise-free quantum channel, Alice and Bob should pos-
sess identical raw keys after sifting.
2. How to catch the eavesdropper
The non-orthogonality principle and the no-cloning
theorem, explained in subsection II B, ensure that Eve
cannot obtain information of the raw key without intro-
ducing errors in the bits that Alice and Bob obtain at
the end of sifting. In fact, as the next stage of the proto-
col, Alice and Bob publicly disclose a small and random
portion of their respective raw keys and check for errors
(bA 6= bB in a given slot). Performing this allows them
to numerically estimate the rate at which errors actually
occur in the raw key. This yields the quantum bit error
rate (QBER) [25], which is one of the most important
parameters for gauging the extent of eavesdropping.
The QBER also determines the course of the rest of
the protocol; for instance, the next step of error cor-
rection, which is necessary to remove the mismatches in
the raw keys, is strongly dependent on the value of the
QBER. More importantly and as we shall explain below
(see also subsection III C), if the QBER is above some
critical value, no secure key can be distilled. In such a
case, Alice and Bob must either resort to another quan-
tum channel or try again later. Although no doubt an
undesirable situation, the fact that Alice and Bob realize
that the communication channels are not safe provides
them the chance to protect their secrets. At present, no
classical cryptographic mechanism that provides such a
functionality is known.
The error correction is followed by a distillation pro-
cedure in which a shorter but highly secure key is dis-
tilled from the longer but perhaps insecure raw key. This
stage is known as privacy amplification [26, 27] since it
increases the confidentiality of the key that Alice and Bob
shared. At the end of this stage, the probability that Eve
has any information of the secret key is reduced to below
some requisite threshold value.
7D. Security proofs
In theory, quantum key distribution can guarantee
information-theoretic security of the message encrypted
by the exchanged key — employed as one time pad — un-
der certain conditions. These conditions are elaborated
in quantum-mechanical security proofs that theoretically
model the actions of all the involved parties (Alice, Bob,
and Eve) and evaluate limits under which privacy am-
plification is successful in nullifying Eve’s information of
the secret key.
Several different approaches for constructing security
proofs (for even the same QKD protocol) are known as of
today [28–34] but at the heart of the majority is a limiting
value QL of the QBER. As also explained before, this is
because the eavesdropper’s actions perturb the quantum
states, causing errors in the measurement stage. The
amount of errors can be quantified by Alice and Bob to
obtain bounds on Eve’s information gain. Consequently,
these proofs also provide a security assurance — in the
form of bounds on the obtainable secret key rates — at
the end of the protocol. Roughly speaking, if the incurred
QBER value q > QL the security of the distilled key may
no longer be guaranteed.
The process of theorizing a security proof for numeri-
cally evaluating QL involves making assumptions about
the physical devices of Alice and Bob, the quantum chan-
nel connecting them, the optimal actions of Eve, etc. As
an example, many well-established security proofs cal-
culate a value of QL ≈ 11.0% for the BB84 protocol.
In these proofs, the state preparation in Alice and state
measurement in Bob are assumed to be ideal. To elabo-
rate, pure single photons are perfectly encoded by Alice
while Bob decodes each of the arriving single photons
with noiseless detectors. The subsystems of Alice and
Bob are also assumed to be perfectly aligned. Eve is as-
sumed to have no physical access to Alice and Bob but
the channels that connect them are her territories. On
the quantum channel, she can interact with the quantum
signals traversing from Alice to Bob. On the authenti-
cated channel, Eve cannot modify the exchanged mes-
sages but may read them without paying any penalty.
Classification of attacks
There are an inexhaustible number of strategies that
Eve may employ to attack the QKD system. The final
objective is to obtain information about the secret key
without alerting Alice and Bob. Let us explain one of
the most well-known strategies called the intercept and
resend attack (IRA). Eve intercepts and measures each
of the signals herself and according to the measurement
result, re-prepares new signals to send to Bob. Assuming
Alice and Bob operate the BB84 protocol, Eve’s measure-
ments (and hence the re-prepared states) can be correct
in only half the total number of instances. Out of the
remaining half, Bob’s measurements would be erroneous
with a probability of 1/2 since Eve’s choice of bases did
not coincide with that of Bob and Alice. In other words,
Alice and Bob would notice errors in around a fourth of
all the cases pointing to q ∼ 25.0% which is clearly much
higher than the tolerable limit of QL ≈ 11.0%. How-
ever, if Eve performs IRA only on a fraction f < 11/25
of all the quantum signals, the QBER incurred by Al-
ice and Bob may not cross the abort threshold; albeit
Eve’s knowledge of the raw key is also reduced from a
factor of 0.5 to (f ∗ 0.5 =)0.22. Alice and Bob must then
make sure that this partial information is removed in the
privacy amplification step.
The intercept and resend attack strategy belongs to
the class of so-called individual attacks [8]. This class
caters to attacks in which Eve individually interacts
with the quantum signals that are enroute from Alice
to Bob. Individual attacks that perform better than an
IRA are already known explicitly for many QKD proto-
cols [31, 33, 35, 36]. This implies that at some q < QL,
Eve’s knowledge of the raw key can be higher than that
obtained via IRA.
The amount of privacy amplification is usually evalu-
ated in the so-called collective attacks scenario by most
security proofs [9, 27, 37]. This class of attacks im-
poses less restrictions on Eve’s actions than individual
attacks, thus making the security proof more general and
stronger. To make things more precise, the security of a
QKD protocol calculated under the assumption of collec-
tive attacks automatically insures the QKD system (op-
erating that QKD protocol) against the best individual
attacks. Nonetheless, collective attacks are still limited to
specific attack strategies, in contrast to coherent attacks
that account for any possible attack strategies limited
only by quantum mechanics. However, and quite remark-
ably so, security against collective attacks also implies
security against coherent attacks under some reasonable
assumptions [27].
III. QUANTUM HACKING
So far we discussed various aspects of quantum key
distribution assuming an ideal world. In real life, the
operation of a QKD protocol deviates from the ideal due
to imperfect components that make up the physical QKD
system. Such deviations can have major implications not
just for the design and performance of the system but also
the security guarantees against attacks [38].
The field of quantum hacking investigates theory-
practice deviations that specifically result in security
loopholes. Given a potential deviation, e.g. due to the
behaviour of a specific set of components, the first step
is to experimentally confirm the existence of the loop-
hole in the QKD implementation. This is followed by
quantifying the impact of the loophole through attack
simulations or further experiments. One tests the design
of a new QKD system by engineering practical attacks
based on known weaknesses and existing loopholes.
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has caught the interest of both the research community
and (scientific) media: more than half-a-dozen research
labs across the world are known to be actively engaged
in this area, the number of publications in peer-reviewed
journals and respectable magazines on this topic has sky-
rocketed, and ‘live hacking’ demonstrations have been
performed at international conferences. Nonetheless, it
must be emphasized that the intention of quantum hack-
ing activities is to improve the security obtainable by
practical QKD implementations. In fact, a complete im-
plementation of the eavesdropping system — demonstra-
tion of the attack on fully-functional Alice and Bob con-
nected by ‘proper’ quantum and authenticated channels
— is rarely performed: most quantum hacking attempts
display the insecurity of the QKD system only in a proof-
of-principle manner. The belief is that bugs and loop-
holes are a part and parcel of any developing technology
and practical QKD is no different in that regard. A tight
scrutiny can therefore ensure the removal of vulnerabil-
ities and patching of loopholes to guarantee reasonable
and acceptable level of security of messages encrypted by
QKD systems in the future.
A. Realistic QKD
We first discuss different aspects of physical QKD sys-
tems to gain an insight into the causes and effects of
problems associated with the field of realistic QKD. We
do so by considering the state preparation and measure-
ment example from subsection II C in presence of chan-
nels, sources, and detectors that are employed in practi-
cal QKD systems.
1. Realistic channels
Absorption and scattering in the channel lead to pho-
ton loss due to which not all quantum states from Alice
reach Bob in practice. Furthermore, the ones that do
arrive may be decoded incorrectly because of the noise
induced by the channel. (Note that Eve’s actions on the
quantum channel can also certainly lead to losses apart
from an increase in the noise, however, here we focus on
an implementation without Eve). This calls for a charac-
terization of the loss and noise properties of the channel.
A frequently-used parameter in that regard is the trans-
mittance T which may be understood as the fraction of
the number of photons from Alice that are received by
Bob. Any realistic channel would have T < 1.
2. Realistic sources and detectors
Apart from the problems with realistic channels, realis-
tic sources and detectors also do not generate and detect
photons in a perfect manner. Most single photon sources
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coded BB84. a) Two detectors are used in order to reduce
inconclusive measurement outcomes due to losses and noise.
b) Using four detectors makes the polarisation modulator dis-
pensable. The basis choice is then mediated passively by a
non-polarising beam splitter (BS). HWP: half wave plate, pol.
mod.: polarisation modulator, PBS: polarising beam splitter,
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(SPSs) show a probability distribution in their photon
number n, featuring non-zero values at n = 0 and n ≥ 2.
In fact, the most popular source used for mimicking SPS
in typical QKD implementations are attenuated lasers.
As mentioned before, the corresponding quantum states
(called weak coherent states) are characterized by a Pois-
sonian distribution with the mean photon number µ. Due
to security reasons that will be explained later, attenu-
ated lasers in Alice employ µ < 1 implying the output
quantum signal is mostly |n = 0〉. The single detector
configuration, shown in Fig. 3c, is therefore completely
impractical because the absence of a click (that would
suggest bit 0) may actually have occurred because no
photon was generated by Alice or the generated photon
was lost in the channel due to attenuation.
A common practice is therefore to employ two detec-
tors (labeled D0 and D1; see Fig. 4a) to measure or-
thogonal polarisations. Inconclusive events when neither
of the two detectors clicks can now be discarded safely.
Note that the basis choice can be done actively, such as by
using a polarisation modulator. Alternatively, the choice
9between Basis 0 or Basis 1 is passively mediated by a
50/50 beam splitter with the quadruple detector assem-
bly, as depicted in Fig. 4b. (The half wave plate rotates
one orthogonal polarisation pair into the other). Due to
the beam splitter, this methods leads to 50% of addi-
tional loss as compared to the scheme with polarisation
modulator.
Just like channels, the loss and noise properties of the
detectors must also be characterized. The probability
of detecting a single photon is given by a detection effi-
ciency η < 1. Many realistic detectors also suffer from
the so-called dark noise (usually denoted by a dark click
probability d > 0) which means that they sometimes pro-
duce clicks even in the absence of photons.
Single photon avalanche diodes (SPADs)
To explain these concepts further, we take up the ex-
ample of single photon avalanche diodes (SPADs) that
are the workhorse detectors for quantum states contain-
ing single/few photons [39]. This minor detour is also ne-
cessitated by the fact that a major part of the discussion
presented in section IV requires a basic understanding of
SPADs.
Figure 5 shows the working principle of an SPAD via its
current-voltage relationship. One can observe a bifurca-
tion in the current-voltage diagram above the breakdown
voltage Vbr of the diode. The rising current in the upper
branch of the bifurcation stems from an avalanche that,
in the nominal case, has been triggered by a single pho-
ton. However, in most SPADs, this event only happens
with a non-unity probability η < 1. In other words, it
might happen that the impinging photon fails to excite
an electron-hole pair. On the other hand, these carri-
ers may be generated due to thermal excitations inside
the SPAD. In the event they result in an avalanche, the
SPAD can register a dark click (denoted by a probabil-
ity d > 0) which cannot be distinguished from photon
clicks. Values such as η ≈ 0.2 − 0.3 and d < 10−5 are
typically obtained for SPADs used in QKD systems these
days [9, 39, 40].
3. Finite QBER without Eve
In addition to dark noise, wrong detection events can
also be caused by imperfect alignment of some optical
components. A misaligned modulator in Fig. 4a, for ex-
ample, would lead to erroneous detections (also see Equa-
tion 1). Furthermore, stray light can lead to false clicks
since SPDs cannot distinguish between signal photons
and stray light.
To sum up, errors — apart from stemming from Eve’s
actions — in the shared key can also happen because of
channel noise, dark click probability, optical misalign-
ment within Bob and Alice, etc. Therefore, a finite
QBER is obtained even without the actions of the ad-
versary. Furthermore, channel losses and noise generally
grow as the distance between Alice and Bob increases.
Due to this, after a certain channel length, the QBER
arising from these various imperfections and inefficien-
cies may easily exceed the critical value QL (see subsec-
tion II D).
4. Industrial implementations
Many renowned institutes and corporate establish-
ments actively pursue research in quantum technologies
today. Startup firms such as ID Quantique [41], one of
the pioneers of practical QKD systems, have been selling
commercial equipment for a decade now. Their approach
blends conventional and quantum encryption: keys ob-
tained independently via RSA and QKD are combined
together for 256-bit AES encryption; see subsection I B.
They also collaborate with research institutes: in fact,
many attacks discussed in section IV were performed on
their research platform ‘Clavis2’ [42]. In the forthcoming
section, we shall elaborate on these attacks.
B. Imperfections and assumptions
In the previous pages, the imperfect behaviour of light
sources and detectors employed in QKD implementations
was discussed. For instance, while realistic single photon
sources may sometimes produce zero or multiple photons
(|n = 0〉 or |n > 1〉 states, respectively), detectors may
sometimes not only fail to detect a photon but also ex-
hibit false detection events (efficiency η < 1 and dark
noise level d > 0, respectively). Such intrinsic limita-
tions have a major impact on the operation of the QKD
system. For instance, dark noise results in a finite QBER
even without Eve’s presence in the quantum channel.
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FIG. 5. Current-voltage characteristics of a single photon
avalanche diode (SPAD). To detect a single photon, the SPAD
is operated in the Geiger mode where a voltage larger than
the breakdown voltage Vbr is applied across the SPAD. In this
regime, a single photon can generate an avalanche of electron-
hole pairs. This avalanche produces a measurable current
through the diode which indicates the detection of the photon.
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Furthermore, the theoretical model considered by the
security proofs (see subsection II D) may make seemingly-
harmless assumptions that can however not be validated,
even in principle. For instance, many of the early secu-
rity proofs implicitly assumed an asymptotic operation
of the QKD protocol, i.e. Alice and Bob were assumed
to exchange infinitely long keys. Only recently, the is-
sue of non-infinite length keys was investigated and the
insecurity arising from such ‘finite size’ effects quanti-
fied [34, 43].
Imperfections in the QKD system hardware and insuf-
ficient/unverified assumptions in the security proof there-
fore lead to deviations between the theoretical model and
the practical implementation. These theory-practice de-
viations often open loopholes in the security framework,
rendering the QKD system vulnerable to quantum hack-
ing. In other words, Eve could manipulate the operation
of the QKD protocol using suitable attack strategies that
violate the guarantees of the security proofs without Al-
ice’s and Bob’s realization.
1. Side channels
The nature of Eve’s action depends on the loophole.
For instance, Eve can actively manipulate the signals
travelling from Alice to Bob on the quantum channel.
Alternatively, she injects some radiation in Alice’s and
Bob’s subsystems with the purpose of modifying the op-
eration of a specific set of components or obtaining in-
formation about their settings. Such attacks generally
carry the risk of being discovered.
In contrast, Eve may also perform certain measure-
ments that do not directly affect Alice or Bob. To be
more precise, Eve does not interact with either the physi-
cal devices or the quantum signals. These attacks usually
happen if and when there is a (possibly inadvertent) leak-
age of information from the QKD devices. The term ‘side
channel’ attacks is sometimes used in such contexts: one
may interpret the encoding/decoding of information tak-
ing place on channels that exist beside the quantum and
authenticated channels. For instance, imagine the send-
ing device of Alice: a metal box that fits inside a standard
19” rack. The box features an LED that is supposed to
indicate the power status of the device. However, due to
bad engineering, the LED’s driving current becomes elec-
tronically coupled to the electro-optical modulator used
for preparing the quantum state in a basis otherwise un-
known to Eve. The impact is that the LED flashes de-
pending on the state of the modulator, thus giving away
the raw key of Alice to an eavesdropper just observing
the device from a distance.
In general, whether a side channel assists Eve depends
on the precise type and quality of the information avail-
able through it. The main point though is that Eve can
avoid alerting Alice and Bob of her eavesdropping actions
in this case.
C. Conditions for successful breach
A quantum hacking attempt is successful if it can be
proven that Eve gains information of a non-negligible
amount of the final secret key extracted by Alice and Bob
without alerting them. The latter may be elaborated by
saying that during Eve’s attack,
1. the incurred QBER must not cross the abort
threshold (q ≤ Qabort), and
2. the fluctuation in the value of channel transmit-
tance observed by Alice and Bob must remain
within tolerable limits (δ < δabort).
The precise values of Qabort and δabort hardwired in the
physical QKD implementation ought to depend on the
QKD protocol and the security proof it follows. The
QKD device manufacturer may however choose more
conservative values. For instance, the research platform
‘Clavis2’ from ID Quantique features Qabort ≈ 8% < QL
and δabort = 0.15 for the BB84 protocol [44, 45].
In the next section, we discuss several quantum hack-
ing attempts that have been devised on a variety of QKD
implementations in the last decade. We also analyze their
performance with respect to the aforementioned condi-
tions. Note that with the possible exception of the work
presented in Ref. [46], all attacks were performed in a
proof-of-principle manner.
IV. LOOPHOLES/ATTACKS IN PRACTICE
In this section, we present the main ideas of several
known attacks on practical QKD. A great deal of them
exploit (natural) limitations in the single photon detec-
tors and/or imperfections in their optoelectronic inter-
faces. The most commonly-discussed detector type in the
next pages shall be the gated 2 single photon avalanche
diode (SPAD). While SPADs have been the workhorse
detectors of single photons [39], unfortunately, they have
also proven to be one of the biggest source of vulnerabil-
ities when it comes to practical security.
A. Faked-state attacks
A majority of attacks on single photon detectors in the
last few years were based on the concept of faked states of
light [47]. These states are specially-crafted optical sig-
nals prepared by Eve and sent into Bob to control his de-
tection outcomes in a manner dictated by her. As shown
2 A train of narrow voltage pulses applied on the diode so that
it switches between the linear mode and Geiger mode are called
gates. Refer subsection III A 2 and Fig. 5 for details on these
modes.
11
quantum channel
intercept 
& 
measure
unit
reprepare 
&
send
unit
Eve
e e e}
quantum signals
from Alice
faked states
to Bob
}
time
Vth0
time
Vth1
Click!
time
Vth0
time
Vth1
a)
b)
BS
D0
D1
identical
basis
choice
e
BS
D0
D1
e different
basis
choice
v
o
lt
a
g
e
v
o
lt
a
g
e
v
o
lt
a
g
e
v
o
lt
a
g
e
FIG. 6. (Color online) Basic principles of faked-state attacks
against BB84. As discussed in subsection II D, Eve intercepts
and measures the quantum signals from Alice in a randomly-
chosen basis. She prepares new states of light to fake detection
events in Bob in a controllable manner. b) If the basis chosen
by Bob is identical to that of Eve, the optical power of Eve’s
faked state is detected fully by one of the two detectors. The
resulting voltage pulse crosses the ‘click’ threshold, given by
Vthj (for j = 0 or 1), and Bob obtains the bit corresponding
to the detector that clicked as the measurement outcome. On
the other hand, if the bases are different, the optical power
is equally split across the detectors. The resulting voltage
pulses in both D0 and D1 are below the respective thresholds
Vth0 and Vth1, and no measurement outcome is recorded.
in Fig. 6a, a faked-state attack (FSA) is implemented in
the style of an intercept and resend attack (IRA), and
targets detector imperfections to perform better than a
conventional IRA. To be more specific, if Eve measures
Alice’s state in the ‘correct’ basis (implying Eve and Al-
ice share the same bit, bE = bA in that slot), her faked
state has two possibilities for Bob:
1. Record a detection with bB = bE if Bob’s chosen
basis coincides with Eve’s basis.
2. No detection event if Bob chooses the incompatible
basis.
Figure 6b displays these two measurement scenarios
(with detectors D0 and D1 assumed to be gated SPADs)
due to faked states prepared in the same basis as that
used by Alice.
However, if Eve measures Alice’s state in the incorrect
basis, the situation is reversed in the sense that a detec-
tion of Eve’s state in Bob would happen only when Bob’s
and Alice’s bases do not coincide. Since such measure-
ment outcomes are sifted (see subsection II C 1), the only
slots kept for further classical processing would be where
Bob registered a detection outcome, and the bases of Al-
ice, Bob and Eve were the same. With the above argu-
ments, it can also be observed that the bits bE = bA = bB
in all such slots. In other words, Eve’s raw key matches
that of Alice and Bob. Thereafter, she can simply listen
to error correction and privacy amplification performed
by Alice and Bob and apply the same operations on her
raw key.
To understand what detector imperfections may enable
such an attack, note that SPADs are sensitive to sin-
gle photons only when they are operated in the Geiger
mode. Conversely, in the linear mode, the SPADs are
not photon-sensitive; they actually act as normal photo-
diodes that output currents proportional to the intensity
of the input optical pulses. A faked-state attack may
then be implemented using pulses of appropriate intensi-
ties if Eve can somehow access Bob’s detectors in linear
mode.
Before we discuss the methods to do so, note that the
intensity levels must be carefully calibrated to control
the detection events: different Bob-Eve basis choice slots
should never result in clicks, identical basis choice slots
should always give clicks. This is illustrated by Fig. 6b.
With perfect control, the attack can satisfy the condi-
tions mentioned in subsection III C easily. In fact, it
can even be completely traceless [48] because in principle
it does not contribute to the incurred QBER. Secondly,
Bob cannot distinguish (at least, not in a simple way)
between the genuine quantum signals and faked states
because the detection statistics can be preserved.
1. Blinding loophole
The notable feature of the first few faked-state at-
tacks [46, 48–50] was on the ability of Eve to remotely
create access to Bob’s SPADs in the linear mode. In
Refs. [46, 48] for instance, Eve sends in CW light from
the quantum channel to Bob, thereby eliciting a current
through the SPADs. The impedance of the high-voltage
supply (connected to the SPAD for biasing) experiences
a voltage drop due to this current. This effectively leads
to a lowering of the reverse bias across the SPAD: at
a specific CW power, the reverse-bias voltage drops be-
low the breakdown voltage; refer Fig. 5. This implies
that the SPAD is out of Geiger mode; or blind to single
photons. The blinding loophole is arguably the most fa-
mous example of quantum hacking; perhaps because it
has also been demonstrated on a variety of single pho-
ton detectors, including those based on superconducting
nanowires [51], gated SPADs [48], and both actively- and
passively-quenched SPADs [46, 52, 53].
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FIG. 7. (Color online) Faked-state pulses for exploiting the
blinding and superlinearity loopholes and used in the after-
gate attack on gated SPADs. The blue line show the gate
voltage as a function of time. The filled objects represent
three different methods for launching the faked-state attack.
(a) A bright faked-state pulse containing a few million pho-
tons on average arrives inside the gate on top of CW light
that has blinded the SPAD. (b) Eve’s pulse in the after-gate
attack is roughly the same intensity as in (a) but arrives after
the falling edge of the gate, i.e. when the SPAD is no longer
in Geiger mode. (c) In the superlinearity loophole, the faked-
state pulse is relatively dim (10− 100 photons per pulse) and
arrives at the falling edge of the gate.
2. After-gate attack
In case of gated SPADs, the linear mode can be re-
motely accessed in a much simpler way, i.e. without
blinding. Typically, the duty cycle of the electronic gat-
ing signal is very small, e.g., it is < 2% for the Clavis2
system [42]. Eve can therefore attack by sending the
bright faked-state pulses to impinge on the detector af-
ter the gate, i.e. when the system has withdrawn the
gate (but may still validate the registration of a click due
to the impinging bright pulse). Figure 7b conveys the
idea, especially relative to the case of blinding, where
the faked-state pulse arrives well inside the gate. Indeed,
in Ref. [50], detector control through bright ‘after-gate’
faked states was demonstrated. However, the bright
pulses in this case led to a severe increase in the dark
noise of the detectors — resulting in a rapid rise of the
QBER. Nonetheless, simulations showed that this prob-
lem could be overcome in at least some operating regimes
of the QKD system. The channel transmittance T could
also be preserved.
3. Superlinearity loophole
The optical intensities required to carry out the above
attacks are tremendously higher than what Bob normally
expects. Simple countermeasures called watchdog moni-
tors, which we shall discuss in more detail in section V,
would catch such attacks. However, if Eve could some-
how use relatively dim faked states, such countermea-
sures might fail. Of course, for the attack to still work as
explained in the beginning of this section, the detector
response needs to be somewhat amplified so that even
pulses that are 4 − 5 orders of magnitude dimmer than
their blinding or after-gate counterparts can provide a
reasonable level of detector control.
Such an amplification of the response, coined superlin-
earity 3 in Ref. [54], is indeed possible if the dim pulse is
sent during the transition from Geiger mode to the linear
mode. An investigation of the gated SPADs of Clavis2
in the same work revealed a high degree of superlinear-
ity: a faked-state pulse containing 10− 100 photons and
arriving on the falling edge of the gate, as depicted in
Fig. 7c, could be detected with a probability much higher
than the theoretically-modelled value. The detector con-
trol however is not perfect: while different Bob-Eve basis
choice slots sometimes result in clicks (that are erroneous
in half the cases), identical basis choice slots do not al-
ways yield clicks. The former leads to an increment in the
QBER while the latter brings down the overall channel
transmittance. Nonetheless, by tuning the parameters
of the faked states, QBER and T could be controlled in
order to satisfy the conditions given in subsection III C.
B. Laser damage attack
Instead of coming down the power scale, the eaves-
dropper can go one step further in the other direction,
i.e. even beyond detector blinding. The intention is to in-
flict optical damage on a certain component in the QKD
system and permanently change its characteristics. If
the new characteristics then assist the eavesdropper in
an attack without Alice or Bob getting any hints of it,
the security of that practical QKD system would be in
serious trouble.
In a recently-demonstrated work [55], the proper-
ties and functionality of single photon avalanche diodes
(SPADs) were studied after exposing them to laser light
with power in the few-watts regime, i.e. 3 − 4 orders of
magnitude higher than the power levels used in blind-
ing [46, 48, 51–53]. As the input power on the SPAD
was increased, a large variety of effects — ranging from a
permanently-induced lowering of the efficiency and dark
noise level to catastrophic damages to its physical struc-
ture — were noticed. Several loopholes due to these ef-
fects were proposed and analyzed.
One of the attacks is based on the ability of the eaves-
dropper to remotely control the detector efficiency and
3 The expected behavior scales as 1− exp[−µ · η(t)] with the mean
photon number µ of a coherent state used for faking the detec-
tion outcomes; η(t) is the single photon detection efficiency as
a function of time. Since η(t) << 1 at the falling edge of the
gate, 1 − exp[−µ · η(t)] ≈ µ · η(t). In other words, the expected
behaviour must be nearly linear. The measured behaviour of the
detection probabilities is however always above this linear curve,
therefore the term superlinear.
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dark noise levels, which conflicts with the assumptions
in most security proofs [9, 30, 33, 36] since these param-
eters are implicitly assumed to be outside Eve’s control.
Some proofs in fact suggest to ‘calibrate’ the dark noise
beforehand and subtract its effect from the QBER to ef-
fectively increase the maximum channel length; see sub-
section III A 2. If Eve could remotely lower the dark noise
of Bob’s detectors, the resultant decrease in the QBER
can be leveraged to attack the system (in some other way,
e.g. using faked states).
At very high power levels, the SPAD was found to be
damaged to the extent that its interconnects had melted,
leaving the component in an open circuit essentially. This
suggests that an SPAD based watchdog monitor, de-
ployed at the entrance of Alice/Bob could be rendered
useless by shooting enormous levels of optical power into
the physical QKD system from the quantum channel. A
heightened vulnerability to faked-state attacks was also
observed due to the blinding effect, which was remark-
ably permanent in this case.
Finally, in some cases, the detection efficiency of the
SPAD was also observed to have substantially decreased.
Given a quadruple detector assembly, such as the one in
Fig. 4b, Eve can target one of the detectors (by choosing
the input polarisation) and reduce its efficiency w.r.t. the
detector meant to measure the orthogonal polarisation.
This opens up the detector efficiency mismatch loophole,
which we describe below.
C. Detection efficiency mismatch loophole
The origin of this loophole lies in the relationship of
Bob’s measurement results with his detectors. Theoreti-
cally, and as explained in subsection II C 1, only the rela-
tive choice of the bases of Alice and Bob must determine
the measurement outcome. Assuming the detector as-
sembly in Fig. 8a, this would require D0 and D1 to be
indistinguishable. This is hard to obtain in practice since
the physical properties of two detectors cannot be the
same. Limitations in the manufacturing process along
with variations in environmental conditions can make the
detectors discernible 4. For example, lengths of the fibers
connecting D0 and D1 can vary [56] due to different tem-
peratures, jitter produced by an electronic circuit fluctu-
ates over time, sensitivities at the same input wavelength
can differ [57] due to intrinsic variations in the material
composition.
If the discerning physical property also aids control
over — the clicking of — the mismatched detectors, a
4 To understand the concept of discernability in a simple way, one
should be able to, for instance, simply exchange D0 and D1 with-
out hindering or altering the operation of the QKD system. Of
course, the key obtained by Bob would then be uniformly oppo-
site to that of Alice but a simple NOT operation would suffice
to reconcile their keys.
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FIG. 8. (Color online) Detection efficiency mismatch and
time-shift attack. a) Bob measures the periodic train of pho-
tons from Alice by selecting bases and measuring the corre-
sponding outcome in D0 or D1 for each photon. b) A sim-
ulated histogram of the instants in time when photodetec-
tion events are recorded by D0[D1] in red[blue]. While not
ideal, the situation is still secure because to Eve, no distin-
guishing information is available. c) The separation in time
between the red and blue histograms results in a mismatch
that Eve can exploit in different ways. d) Schematic of the
equipment to attack the insecure system shown in c) by de-
laying/advancing the arrival time of Alice’s photons in Bob.
QKD system that employs that pair of detectors will
carry a risk of an attack due to the detection efficiency
mismatch (DEM) loophole [56]. Figures 8a–8c explain
the idea of the loophole, with the discerning physical
property being time. In an ideal world, a periodic train
of incoming photons would be detected and counted at
precisely the same time (say t = 0, measured relative to
a reference, such as the system clock) in both D0 and
D1. In practice, however, there is a spread as illustrated
by the red and blue histograms of the arrival times mea-
sured by D0 and D1 in Fig. 8b, with T denoting the full
width at half maximum (FWHM) value. Nonetheless,
the large overlap between the two histograms signifies
that the detectors are not easily discernible.
The outer envelopes of the histograms correspond to
the detection efficiencies η0(t) and η1(t) of D0 and D1,
respectively, as a function of time. The efficiency mis-
match that allows distinguishing the detectors strongly
depends on the temporal separation δτ between the effi-
ciency curves. This can be easily visualized by comparing
Figs. 8c and 8b.
Two attacks for exploiting the DEM loophole are
known. In the original proposal [56], an attack using
faked states [47] was considered and its performance was
theoretically analyzed. A simpler alternative which we
discuss below is the time-shift attack [58]. Notably, this
was the first known quantum hacking attempt on a com-
mercial QKD system.
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D. Time-shift attack
Suppose Eve is aware that the QKD implementation
suffers from detection efficiency mismatch as illustrated
in Fig. 8c. To attack the system, she can simply delay
or advance the arrival of the quantum signal pulses in
Bob’s subsystem randomly. Figure 8d shows an appara-
tus constructed using optical switches and fibre patch-
cords that can perform the above actions, once installed
in the quantum channel.
Using a sufficiently long[short] fibre patch cord to act
as the delaying[advancing] arm, Eve can make sure that
the probability for Bob to detect a photon in D1[D0] is
negligible even if his basis choice relative to Alice’s should
have resulted in that outcome. Due to this, Bob’s mea-
surement outcomes are highly dependent and correlated
with Eve’s actions. The keys obtained by Bob and Alice
would be quite similar to that of Eve (delaying ≡ bit 0
and advancing ≡ bit 1).
Nonetheless, one can realize that the time-shifting ac-
tion results in fewer detection events than normally ex-
pected. This impacts the estimation of the channel trans-
mittance and implies that the second condition listed in
subsection III C may be hard to satisfy. Also, the in-
curred QBER would elevate as the ‘photonic’ detections
are lowered with respect to the intrinsic ‘dark noise’ of
the detectors; see subsection III A 2.
More practically, the assumption that Eve knows the
exact nature of detection efficiency mismatch may not
hold true. In the actual demonstration [58], the au-
thors (who obviously had access to the QKD system)
performed the time shifts only in the instances where the
efficiency mismatch favoured their attack. But in prac-
tice, Eve does not have access to the actual system and
there is no information that allows her to control or pre-
dict the temporal separation δτ . Even worse, δτ is a
stochastic quantity fluctuating around zero. Figure 9 il-
lustrates this scenario (only the green disks) for Clavis2;
we shall explain this in more detail below. Its impact on
the efficacy of a realistic time-shift attack should however
be clear: instances in which |δτ | is large (as marked by
the green disks with red borders) occur in < 5% of all
instances.
E. Calibration loophole
To use the time-shift attack successfully, Eve needs
the QKD system to somehow exhibit a large temporal
separation. Additionally, the corresponding detection ef-
ficiency mismatch must remain deterministic and ideally,
the variance of δτ must be as low as possible. The right
hand side of Fig. 9 (i.e. only the red dots) depicts a
scenario in which at least the first condition is satis-
fied. These points were experimentally observed on the
Clavis2 QKD system [42] by repetitively running by the
detector calibration routine in a manner that remotely
exploited a loophole in the routine firmware and led to
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FIG. 9. (Color online) Shift in the temporal separation be-
tween the detectors of Clavis2 due to Eve’s manipulation.
Experimentally measured values of the temporal separation
obtained after calibration runs operated without (in green)
and with (in red) Eve’s hack; T is the FWHM value of the
distributions shown in Figs. 8b and 8c. The induced detec-
tion efficiency mismatch (DEM) after the hack is sufficiently
high to increase the efficacy of a time-shift attack [58], or even
launch a successful faked-state attack [44].
the induction of this temporal separation [44].
It can be compared with the situation when the cali-
bration routine was run normally (green dots in Fig. 9).
Note that while the corresponding average value of δτ ,
shown by the dashed-green line, is indeed quite close to
zero, a small fraction of calibration runs did exhibit high
detection efficiency mismatch. These instances are de-
picted by green dots with red borders.
The calibration routine is run by Clavis2 intermittently
between the key exchanges to reduce any existent DEM,
which can occur over time due to reasons explained in
subsection IV C. The basic steps are: Alice sends a train
of classical light pulses (instead of quantum signals) to
Bob over the quantum channel. Bob periodically scans
in time the arrival of Alice’s pulses by changing the gate-
activation times of both detectors independently. As and
when the activation instant coincides with the impinging
of the pulse on say D0, the number of photon detec-
tion events recorded in D0 reaches maximum. A similar
maximum in D1 is recorded; the final situation ideally
looks like the one presented in Fig. 8b. The correspond-
ing value of δτ ≈ 0.0 on average, as illustrated by the
green-dashed line in Fig. 9.
The weakness that allowed the exploitation of this
loophole arose due to the fixed settings of bases by Alice
and Bob during the calibration phase [44]. In the normal
case, photons from any part of Alice’s optical pulse can
yield a click in Bob’s detectors. However, Eve can manip-
ulate these classical pulses (on the quantum channel) in
such a way that the first temporal half yields clicks only
in D1, while the second half yields clicks only in D0. This
results in a situation similar to that shown in Fig. 8c. Ex-
perimentally, an average separation δτ > 2T is achieved,
as illustrated by the dotted-red line in Fig. 9. This large
efficiency mismatch induced between Bob’s detectors can
be exploited by a faked-states attack and the conditions
of subsection III C can be satisfied for a large range of
the channel transmittance values.
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FIG. 10. (Color online) Intercept and resend strategy to ex-
ploit the wavelength dependence of a beam splitter. Eve in-
tercepts and measures the photon from Alice in Basis j (j = 0
or 1). The passive beam splitter (BS) in Bob has a very dif-
ferent splitting ratio at λj with the values R(λ0) = 0.3×10−2
and R(λ1) = 0.986 experimentally observed in Ref. [60] for
λ0 = 1290 nm and λ1 = 1470 nm. Eve’s resent state (not nec-
essarily quantum in nature) to Bob is prepared at λj which
means that the chances of Bob measuring it in the Basis i are
quite low[high] if i 6= j[i = j]. Also, Eve can easily select the
detector to be clicked (D0 or D1) by choosing an appropriate
polarisation for her resent state.
F. Wavelength-dependent beam splitter attack
Imperfections in components other than detectors can
also result in vulnerabilities. A recent example [59, 60]
is due to the wavelength dependence of a beam splitter,
which is one of the most frequently-used components in
quantum-optical experiments. A symmetric beam split-
ter employed at the telecom wavelength of λ ≈ 1550 nm
would have roughly the same reflectivity and transmittiv-
ity values, i.e. R(λ) ≈ T (λ) ≈ 0.50 (the absorption losses
are usually insignificant). A photon passing through this
beam splitter would hence be detected in the transmis-
sive or the reflective output with equal probability.
The response of the same beam splitter at other wave-
lengths can however be quite different. Let us assume
there are two wavelengths λ0 6= λ1 at which the beam
splitter is highly transmissive and highly reflective, re-
spectively, i.e. T (λ0) . 1.0 and R(λ1) . 1.0. An
attacker can substitute the quantum signals at λ with
light at λ0[λ1] to address only the transmissive[reflective]
port in a deterministic fashion. More specifically, an in-
tercept and resend attack that exploits the wavelength
dependence is possible. Figure 10 shows the scheme of
such an attack demonstrated with λ0 = 1290 nm and
λ1 = 1470 nm [60].
The attack reportedly did not increase the QBER mea-
sured by Bob in any significant manner. Although the
detection efficiency of Bob’s SPADs also varied at λ0 and
λ1, any differences in the detection rates (with respect to
the values expected at the normal wavelength λ) could
be compensated by employing appropriately-bright co-
herent states in the resending stage.
G. Trojan-horse attacks
Trojan-horse attacks are amongst the most well-known
class of attacks on practical QKD implementations. This
term has been borrowed from classical cryptography al-
though in the context of practical QKD, it is a misnomer
since most attacks demonstrated in this category do not
involve Alice or Bob accepting seemingly-benign objects
from Eve. Coined in Ref. [61], the term has become
well established over the years even though another term
‘large pulse attack’ for the same concept had been pro-
posed [62, 63]. Nonetheless, to maintain consistency, we
shall not buck the trend here.
In principle, the basic idea facilitating these attacks
is that light is reflected/scattered back as it propagates
through optical components. For instance, the change
of refractive index across an interface between two com-
ponents results in a Fresnel reflection. In case the light
encounters mirror-like surfaces, a specular reflection is
obtained. If the back-reflected photons travel through a
basis selector, such as those shown in Figs. 3b and 4a,
they can capture the state of the polarizer or the mod-
ulator. If they also eventually trickle out of the QKD
system unnoticed onto the quantum channel, Eve can in-
tercept them and perform appropriate measurements to
discriminate between different bases settings.
Eve can actively create grounds for such an attack by
sending bright pulses into the equipment of Alice/Bob
from the quantum channel and scanning through the dif-
ferent reflections to obtain the relevant information. The
works in Refs [61, 63] explored the basic ideas and appli-
cability conditions for implementing such type of attacks.
They also proposed experimental tools, e.g. optical time
domain reflectometers, to quantify the reflections in time
and amplitude of a fibre-optical system. This facilitated
building of the (static) reflection maps of sample QKD
systems which could be crucial to decide Eve’s photon
budget. Recently, proof-of-principle attacks were car-
ried out in real-time on the QKD research platforms of
ID Quantique and SeQureNet [45, 64]. The basic mes-
sage of these attacks is that Eve can probe the settings
of the basis selector on-the-fly and just with a handful of
the back-reflected photons.
Eve’s attack may be caught using a so-called watch-
dog monitor, which we shall describe in some detail in
the next section. Alternatively, an optical isolator can
thwart the attack by simply preventing light from Eve
to even enter the QKD system. However, apart from the
fact that such countermeasures cannot always be simply
adopted for a given QKD system, they may anyway prove
vulnerable if Eve resorts to another wavelength for the
attack [45, 65].
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FIG. 11. (Color online) Basic QKD implementation with
watchdog detectors to guard against Eve’s radiation. The
detectors monitor the incoming light to find out if Eve is car-
rying out an attack. These monitoring devices may be con-
nected to the rest of the QKD system via a coupler or a switch.
Ideally, a watchdog detector should be able to discern legit-
imate quantum signals from Eve’s radiation to prevent false
alarms.
V. COUNTERMEASURES
In the previous pages, we have demonstrated ample
cases of how a quantum hacker exploits deviations be-
tween the theoretical model and the practical implemen-
tation to attack the QKD system. We now discuss ap-
proaches and mechanisms — technically referred to as
countermeasures — to prevent or catch such attacks from
breaking the security, thereby restoring the security of
the practical QKD system.
A. Basic approaches
Against side channels in particular, two approaches are
possible: eliminate the leakage of information or make
it useless for the adversary. The first is usually quite
difficult, a better practice is to try binding the leakage
and performing higher privacy amplification. Alterna-
tively, the correlations between the side channel informa-
tion and the actual secret encoding/decoding data can be
reduced to the minimum possible level [66].
1. Addition or modification in hardware/software
For a significant number of attacks on QKD systems
discussed above, Eve employs bright light pulses. In the
cases of blinding and after-gate attacks [46, 48, 50, 51],
she sends the bright light towards Bob, targeting the im-
perfections of the detection system. In a Trojan-horse
attack, Alice’s device could also be subject to the bright
illumination. For one-way QKD systems, an optical iso-
lator at Alice’s entrance can be used to block the light
from Eve. A more universal method consists in placing an
additional detector at the entrance of Alice’s and Bob’s
device. This so-called watchdog detector ideally monitors
a portion of all incoming radiation; see Fig. 11. When
the incoming light intensity is above a certain threshold,
the QKD operation is interrupted and an alarm is raised.
In practice, a compromise is required between the frac-
tion of light being monitored by the watchdog detector
and the losses induced by the tap. Randomly switching
between using the incoming light for QKD operation and
for monitoring offers an alternative [45]. Another method
would be to use the quantum light detectors themselves
to monitor unwanted incoming light. As reported in
Ref. [67], traces of several attacks can be found by care-
fully analysing the detection statistics from the quantum
detectors. Instead of additional hardware, the counter-
measure can therefore be implemented in a software algo-
rithm. A software countermeasure can also repel the cal-
ibration loophole described in section IV E. The software
patch consists in implementing a random basis choice in
Bob during the calibration routine as well [44].
Changes in hardware are usually considered the last re-
sort. Apart from the obvious investment of time, effort,
and money in installing and testing the new hardware,
such countermeasures can also prove to be the source of
new risks. Alternatively, they may even prove insuffi-
cient in protecting the QKD system. For example, it is
vital that both isolators and watchdog detectors func-
tion in the desired manner at ideally all the wavelengths
that Eve could use to attack Alice’s or Bob’s devices [65].
However, due to intrinsic limitations, as explained further
in subsection V C below, this is quite difficult to guaran-
tee. In other words, such countermeasures would provide
Alice and Bob with a false sense of security.
2. Incorporating imperfections in security proof
In some cases, the imperfections of the QKD system
can be theoretically quantified. An example is the loop-
hole arising due to the different spectral distributions of
the individual laser diodes used to prepare the quantum
state alphabet [66]. In this case, information leaked to
Eve can be erased by applying more privacy amplifica-
tion. This effectively shrinks the key but with the assur-
ance that Eve’s partial information is destroyed. Mea-
sures like these are highly beneficial for practical QKD
since by directly considering the loophole in the secu-
rity proof, they reduce the theory-practice deviation.
Recently, quantitative bounds for a system exposed to
Trojan-horse attacks were reported, and a passive archi-
tecture to counteract the attack was proposed [68]. The
key element in the evaluation – based on the specifica-
tions of realistic optical components used in QKD – was
to treat the Trojan-horse attack as a side channel.
B. Conceiving novel QKD schemes
Instead of patching existent QKD protocols, it is also
possible to devise schemes that are immune to one or
more classes of hacking attacks. Device independent
QKD (DI-QKD) is based on the violation of a Bell in-
equality in an entanglement-based QKD scheme [69].
Such a violation can occur only when Alice and Bob share
quantum correlations. Proving a Bell inequality violation
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relieves Alice and Bob from the need to exactly charac-
terise the imperfections of their sources and detectors in
the context of possible attacks. However, DI-QKD cur-
rently suffers from major practical drawbacks. The tol-
erable losses are so low that a nearly loss-less channel (in
combination with highly-efficient detectors) is required.
The extreme requirements of DI-QKD can be relaxed
when employing the concept of measurement device in-
dependent QKD (MDI-QKD) [70, 71]. Here, the sources
of Alice and Bob are assumed to be outside the reach
of Eve, whereas the detectors need not be trusted and
can even be controlled by Eve. (More generally, the idea
of public-private spaces of Alice and Bob and untrusted
relays in the middle to perform quantum measurements
– on the public systems of Alice and Bob – can be used
for designing QKD schemes that are free of all side chan-
nels [71].) This is a remarkable development for QKD
since the majority of attacks so far exploited the imper-
fections in the detection apparatus. In the MDI-QKD
scheme, Alice and Bob send quantum states to an un-
trusted relay called Charles who performs a Bell state
measurement. The relay is potentially controlled by Eve,
its trustworthiness is checked publicly by analysing the
outcomes of the Bell state measurements. This scheme
tolerates losses in the same order as standard QKD pro-
tocols and is therefore practically feasible [72].
Another idea that can address numerous vulnerabili-
ties in the photon detection apparatus of realistic QKD
implementations is to use optical sum frequency genera-
tion, or upconversion, to protect Bob [73]. The process
of upconversion employs a nonlinear interaction between
the quantum signal (from Alice) and a bright pump (in-
side Bob), and the characteristics of the pump may be
manipulated/monitored by Bob to prevent/detect a wide
range of quantum hacking attacks launched by Eve. In
that sense, such an upconversion protected QKD receiver
is similar to MDI-QKD, though unlike the latter, it lacks
a rigorous security proof.
Finally, continuous-variable (CV) QKD schemes em-
ploy homodyne detection of light using photodetectors
that operate in the linear regime. Therefore, the faked-
states attacks described in subsection IV A are not
straightforwardly implementable on CV-QKD systems.
However, in a majority of CV-QKD setups, an additional
reference beam travels through Eve’s domain. Care has
to be taken that Eve’s potential manipulations of this
reference are monitored [74–76].
C. Word of caution against intuitive measures
1. Isolators against Trojan-horse attacks
As mentioned above, optical isolato is one of the best-
known measures to shield practical QKD systems against
Trojan-horse attacks. Such a device lets light pass when
it comes from the forward direction, but blocks it when
coming from the reverse direction. However, it was re-
cently discovered that the light blockage can be guaran-
teed only in a narrow region around the design wave-
length [65]. Eve can therefore just choose another wave-
length where the extinction level of the isolator (in double
pass) is insufficient. This phenomena occurs since typical
isolators are based on the wavelength-dependent Faraday
effect. A solution to this vulnerability is to use the optical
isolator in conjunction with a wavelength filter [65].
2. Watchdogs (superlinearity loophole)
The superlinearity loophole as described in subsec-
tion IV A 3 can be exploited by dim states of light injected
by Eve into Bob’s device. Therefore this attack is difficult
to catch with standard powermeter based watchdog de-
tectors monitoring the incoming light power. The watch-
dog detector itself would have to be sensitive on the few
photon level, exposing it to loopholes discussed in sec-
tion IV A. A remedy to this loophole consists in applying
gates with a varying activation time or width [77]. An-
other possibility consists in the modification of the map-
ping between detectors and bit value [78]. This remap-
ping is done both in software and in the optical system
by applying a phase shift of either 0 or pi. This so-called
bit-mapped gating leads to a QBER of 50% for detections
outside the middle of the gate.
VI. TAKE-HOME MESSAGE
As it celebrates its 30th anniversary, quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) has evolved from being just ‘a beauti-
ful idea’ to the first applied quantum technology [8, 9,
15, 17]. However, as and when a technology matures,
bugs and loopholes are imminent. Quantum hacking ad-
dresses the deviations between the theoretical and prac-
tical worlds of QKD by discovering and closing loopholes
and thus should be considered as a natural as well as es-
sential ingredient in the evolution. Let us emphasize that
the role of quantum hacking is not to derail its progress
but to prevent security problems in future if and when
QKD is deployed. That fortunately has also been the
case so far: the rise of quantum hacking has also gone
hand in hand with miscellaneous landmarks in the last
decade. To name a few:
• Maximum possible distance between Alice and Bob
has surpassed lengths well over 100 km [79–83] and
satellite quantum communication is in development
at several places in the world. (Depending on
the application scenario, different orbital distances
have been considered [84–86]).
• QKD links between rapidly-moving or floating plat-
forms have been demonstrated [87, 88].
• Fiber networks with multiple nodes and new archi-
tectures have been established [89–91].
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• Efforts for the standardization of QKD spear-
headed by the European Telecommunication Stan-
dards Institute (ETSI) are in a fairly mature
stage [12].
With advances in quantum computation threatening the
security of public key cryptographic systems, it is im-
portant that security of technologies such as practical
quantum key distribution be scrutinized so that viable
alternatives are present in the future.
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